Dana A. Shea
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has statutory authority to
regulate chemical facilities for security purposes. The 113th Congress extended this
authority through January 15, 2014. Congressional policymakers have
debated the scope and details of reauthorization and continue to consider
establishing an authority with longer duration. Some Members of Congress support
an extension, either short- or long-term, of the existing authority. Other
Members call for revision and more extensive codification of chemical
facility security regulatory provisions. Questions regarding the current
law’s effectiveness in reducing chemical facility risk and the sufficiency of
federal chemical facility security efforts exacerbate the tension between
continuing current policies and changing the statutory authority.
Congressional policymakers have questioned DHS’s effectiveness in implementing
the authorized regulations, called chemical facility anti-terrorism
standards (CFATS). The DHS finalized CFATS regulations in 2007. Since
then, 348 chemical facilities have been approved in the CFATS process,
which starts with information submission by chemical facilities and finishes
with inspection and approval of facility security measures by DHS. Several
factors, including the amount of detailed information provided to DHS, the
effectiveness of DHS program management, and the availability of CFATS inspectors,
likely complicate the inspection process and lead to delays in inspection.
Policymakers have questioned whether the compliance rate with CFATS is
sufficient to mitigate this homeland security risk.
Key policy issues debated in previous Congresses contribute to the current
reauthorization debate. These issues include the adequacy of DHS resources
and efforts; the appropriateness and scope of federal preemption of state
chemical facility security activities; the availability of information for public
comment, potential litigation, and congressional oversight; the range of
chemical facilities identified by DHS; and the ability of inherently safer
technologies to achieve security goals.
The 113th Congress might take various approaches to this issue. Congress might
allow the statutory authority to expire but continue providing
appropriations to administer the regulations. Congress might permanently
or temporarily extend the statutory authority to observe the impact of the
current regulations and, if necessary, address any perceived weaknesses at a
later date. Congress might codify the existing regulations in statute and
reduce the discretion available to the Secretary of Homeland Security to
change the current regulatory framework. Alternatively, Congress might
substantively change the current regulation’s implementation, scope, or impact by
amending the existing statute or creating a new one. Finally, Congress might
choose to terminate the program by allowing its authority to lapse and
removing funding for the program. This would leave regulation of chemical
facility security to state and local governments.
Date of Report: November 15, 2013
Number of Pages: 46
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Lennard G. Kruger
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy
The Internet is often described as a “network of networks” because it is
not a single physical entity, but hundreds of thousands of interconnected
networks linking hundreds of millions of computers around the world. As
such, the Internet is international, decentralized, and comprised of networks
and infrastructure largely owned and operated by private sector entities. As
the Internet grows and becomes more pervasive in all aspects of modern
society, the question of how it should be governed becomes more
pressing.
Currently, an important aspect of the Internet is governed by a private sector,
international organization called the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN), which manages and oversees some of the critical
technical underpinnings of the Internet such as the domain name system and
Internet Protocol (IP) addressing. ICANN makes its policy decisions using
a multistakeholder model of governance, in which a “bottom-up” collaborative
process is open to all constituencies of Internet stakeholders.
National governments have recognized an increasing stake in ICANN policy
decisions, especially in cases where Internet policy intersects with
national laws addressing such issues as intellectual property, privacy,
law enforcement, and cybersecurity. Some governments around the world
are advocating increased intergovernmental influence over the way the
Internet is governed. For example, specific proposals have been advanced
that would create an Internet governance entity within the United Nations
(U.N.). Other governments (including the United States), as well as many
other Internet stakeholders, oppose these proposals and argue that ICANN’s multistakeholder
model, while not perfect and needing improvement, is the most appropriate
way to govern the Internet.
Currently, the U.S. government, through the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) at the Department of Commerce, enjoys a
unique influence over ICANN, largely by virtue of its legacy relationship
with the Internet and the domain name system. A key issue for the 113th Congress is whether and how
the U.S. government should continue to maximize U.S. influence over
ICANN’s multistakeholder Internet governance process, while at the same
time effectively resisting proposals for an increased role by international
governmental institutions such as the U.N. An ongoing concern is to what
extent will future intergovernmental telecommunications conferences (such as
the December 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications or WCIT) constitute an opportunity for some nations to increase intergovernmental
control over the Internet, and how effectively will NTIA and other
government agencies (such as the State Department) work to counteract that
threat? H.R. 1580, introduced on April 16, 2013, states that “[I]t is the
policy of the United States to preserve and advance the successful
multistakeholder model that governs the Internet.”
The ongoing debate over Internet governance will likely have a significant
impact on how other aspects of the Internet may be governed in the future,
especially in such areas as intellectual property, privacy, law
enforcement, Internet free speech, and cybersecurity. Looking forward,
the institutional nature of Internet governance could have far-reaching
implications on important policy decisions that will likely shape the
future evolution of the Internet.
Date of Report: November 13, 2013
Number of Pages: 26
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John R. Thomas
Visiting Scholar
Congressional interest in the patent system has been demonstrated by the
enactment of the Leahy- Smith America Invents Act (AIA) in the 112th Congress. Most of the
provisions of the AIA apply to any type of patented invention, whether it
consists of a chemical compound, mechanical device, electrical circuit, or
other technology. However, other AIA provisions are specific to particular
types of inventions, including business methods, tax strategies, and human
organisms. The AIA reflects the principle that, for the most part,
patentable inventions are generally subject to the same statutory provisions.
However, a number of exceptions exist to this concept of technological
neutrality.
This blended architecture has for many years prompted inquiry into whether the
patent system operates best as a uniform system that applies neutrally to
all inventions, or whether it could or should be tailored to meet the
specific needs of different industries. Technologies and
industrial sectors arguably differ in ways salient to the patent system.
Among these distinctions are the costs and risks of research and
development, the availability of trade secret protection as an
effective alternative to patenting, the number of patents that cover a
particular product, and the patterns of patent acquisition and enforcement
of firms within that sector. The patent system involves a number of parameters
that could potentially be adjusted to meet the needs of individual sectors, including
the speed with which applications are reviewed, the scope of exclusive rights
afforded by a patent, and the term of the patent.
While some observers suggest the desirability of sector-specific patent
principles, others believe them to be infeasible and unwise. They observe
that legislative efforts to define particular industries may prove
difficult, that attorneys may sometimes be able to draft patents artfully so
as to fall within a favored category, and that U.S. industry is dynamic
and resistive to a static statutory definition. In addition, U.S.
membership within the World Trade Organization (WTO) may limit the ability
to tailor the patent system to account for different industries and
inventions, to the extent that compliance with WTO standards is desired.
The WTO-administered Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property, or TRIPS Agreement, in part requires WTO member states to make patent
rights available without discrimination as to the field of technology. The
TRIPS Agreement admits some exceptions exist to this principle of technological
neutrality, however.
Should Congress believe current circumstances to be appropriate, then no action
need be taken. To the degree WTO compliance is desired, Congress could
also legislate along the lines permitted by the TRIPS Agreement. Notably,
although the TRIPS Agreement generally disallows discrimination with
respect to technological fields, it permits distinctions on other
grounds. Congress could also make use of regulatory exclusivities and
other complementary intellectual property rights that the TRIPS Agreement
regulates less heavily.
Date of Report: October 29, 2013
Number of Pages: 16
Order Number: R43264
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